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NOTES
NEW PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT LAW: THE MONTANA
SUPREME COURT EXPANDS PUBLIC ACCESS TO
PRIVATE LAND IN PUBLIC LANDS ACCESS ASS’N V.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
OF MADISON COUNTY
Elijah L. Inabnit*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Public Lands Access Ass’n v. Board of County Commissioners of
Madison County,1 the Montana Supreme Court decided an issue of first
impression in Montana by holding that a public road right-of-way estab-
lished by prescriptive use was not limited to the use through which the
easement was acquired, but could include “any foreseeable uses,” including
recreational use.2 In reaching this conclusion, the Court also made signifi-
cant decisions affecting well-established laws regarding public prescriptive
easements in Montana. The Court’s conclusion gives the public an unfet-
tered right to access the maintenance area of a public prescriptive easement.
Moreover, the Court held non-historical use of the easement could inform a
determination of the easement’s width. While the Court’s decision that pub-
lic easements are not limited to historic uses is consistent with numerous
other states that have determined the scope of use for public prescriptive
* Candidate for J.D. 2017, Alexander Blewett III School of Law. The author thanks his friends
and family for their continued support throughout the writing process, especially Steve and Erica. Spe-
cial thanks to Professor Anthony Johnstone for his advice and continued dedication to the improvement
of Montana Law Review articles. Additional thanks to the Montana Law Review editors and staff for
their diligent attention to detail.
1. 321 P.3d 38 (Mont. 2014).
2. Id. at 49.
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easements as expansive enough to include reasonably foreseeable public
uses,3 the right the Court granted the public and the means for defining the
right are inconsistent with Montana’s established easement laws. By so
holding, the Court has extended means for the public to access surface wa-
ters and tacitly promoted Montana’s “cultural and economic necessity” of
recreational stream access.4 The Court’s expansion of the public’s rights in
prescriptive easements comes at a high cost to landowners’ rights and dem-
onstrates a failure of the Court to balance the interests of the public with
those of private landowners.
This note discusses the Court’s holding in Public Lands Access Ass’n
in relation to Montana’s established easement law. Part II describes the le-
gal backdrop to Public Lands Access Ass’n that influenced the Court’s deci-
sion. Part III of this note summarizes the factual and procedural background
of Public Lands Access Ass’n. Part IV discusses the parties’ arguments, the
Court’s reasoning and holding, and Justice McKinnon’s dissenting opinion.
Part V explains two reasons why the Court’s holding is flawed when com-
pared to precedent. This note concludes with a summary of Public Lands
Access Ass’n’s significance, especially considering the well-established pre-
scriptive easement law in Montana.
II. BACKDROP: PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS AND THE MONTANA
STREAM ACCESS LAW
Montanans pride themselves on their many outdoor recreational oppor-
tunities, the common complaint being that there is not enough time to do
everything Montana has to offer. Living in a state that seems to provide
endless recreation can make it easy to forget that not every draw is open for
hunting, not every trail is open to riding, and not every bridge is open for
fishing access. Where Montanans may recreate has been a constant contro-
versy that spans many different recreational pursuits.5 However, increasing
public access to Montana’s rivers by expanding public prescriptive ease-
ment rights needlessly burdens the private landowner in a way that is ineq-
uitable and inconsistent with the laws of prescription. The Supreme Court’s
3. E.g., Lovvorn v. Salisbury, 701 P.2d 142, 144 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985); Boykin v. Carbon Cnty.
Bd. of Comm’rs, 124 P.3d 677, 685–686 (Wyo. 2005); Bentel v. Cnty. of Bannock, 656 P.2d 1383,
1386 (Idaho 1983).
4. Sarah K. Stauffer, Comment, The Row on the Ruby: State Management of Public Trust Re-
sources, the Right to Exclude, and the Future of Recreational Stream Access in Montana, 36 ENVTL. L.
1421, 1424 (2006).
5. See, e.g., Perry Backus, Off-Road Riders Say They Are Being Shut Out, MISSOULIAN (Feb. 16,
2006), http://perma.cc/U5C7-XHFT (off-road riding area controversy); Cavan Williams, Bitterroot Lo-
cals and Climbers Seek a Solution, MONTANA KAIMAN (Sept. 24, 2014), http://perma.cc/8B59-67TM
(rock climbing area controversy); Marshall Swearingen, Private Property Blocks Access to Public
Lands, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Feb. 2, 2015), http://perma.cc/4XN9-E36V (hunting access dispute).
2
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decision in Public Lands Access Ass’n impacts the long dispute over where
Montanans may access the surface waters that are held for public use by the
State. The Court’s decision raises questions over the Court’s interpretation
of established prescriptive easement laws. To analyze these issues, it is nec-
essary to first examine the laws concerning prescriptive easements as well
as the legal morass behind the Court’s decision.
A. Prescriptive Easements
Today’s prescriptive easement is a product of centuries of English and
American common law dating back to before 1275.6 Prescription gives a
property interest to “someone who makes an unauthorized use” of another’s
property for a “sufficiently long period of time.”7 The English courts devel-
oped the fictional “lost grant” as a way to effectively allow prescriptive use;
the fiction being that, after a set number of years, the adverse users of land
were presumed to have lost their “grant conveying the right of use.”8 As a
result of the fictional lost grant, prescriptive easements could only exist if
the adverse use “could have been the subject of a grant” in the first place.9
The law of prescriptive easements has been accused of rewarding the “ad
hoc use of a trespasser” over the planned use of a landowner, raising the
question: “Can it be fair to reward a wrongdoer and punish an innocent
property owner?”10 The fact that American jurisprudence has continued to
uphold prescriptive easement law indicates that the answer is yes. However,
each state validates the law of prescription in different ways.
In Montana, prescription invokes over one hundred years of common
law jurisprudence that governs the creation, breadth, and scope of prescrip-
tive easements.11 A public or private prescriptive easement is “created by
operation of the law.”12 To establish either easement, the party claiming the
easement must show “open, notorious, exclusive, adverse, continuous and
uninterrupted use of the easement . . . for the full statutory period.”13 The
statutory period for adverse use is five years.14 Establishing a public road
by prescription further requires that the public “have pursued a definite,
6. Michael V. Hernandez, Restating Implied, Prescriptive, and Statutory Easements, 40 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 75, 103 (2005).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 103–104.
9. Id. at 104.
10. Warsaw v. Chi. Metallic Ceilings, Inc., 676 P.2d 564, 593–594 (Cal. 1984) (Reynoso, J., dis-
senting).
11. Pub. Lands Access Ass’n, 321 P.3d at 58 (McKinnon, J., dissenting).
12. Swandal Ranch Co. v. Hunt, 915 P.2d 840, 843 (Mont. 1996).
13. Id.
14. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70–19–404 (2013).
3
Inabnit: Montana's Expansion of Prescriptive Easement Law in PLAA v. Madison County
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2016
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\77-1\MON103.txt unknown Seq: 4  9-FEB-16 12:55
188 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 77
fixed course, continuously and uninterruptedly.”15 This definite and fixed
path may not “permit of any deviation.”16 Accordingly, the public’s use of
one part of the road does not give the public any claim to land beyond what
has been publicly occupied.17 The public can gain a prescriptive easement
through adverse use of only that land used during the full statutory period.18
Further, the public’s acquired right “can never exceed the greatest use made
of the land for the full prescriptive period.”19 A “secondary easement” is
granted incident to the grant of a prescriptive easement for the purpose of
repairing and maintaining the easement.20 This secondary easement gives
the owner of the easement the right to “enter upon the servient estate and
make repairs necessary for the reasonable and convenient use of the ease-
ment.”21 However, this right “can be exercised only when necessary” and
must be exercised in a way that does not “needlessly increase the burden
upon” or unnecessarily injure the servient estate.22 This standard for reason-
able use of a prescriptive easement is well-established in Montana.23 The
Supreme Court’s decision in Public Lands Access Ass’n upsets the estab-
lished precedent regarding prescriptive easements and raises questions
about future application of the law of prescription.
B. The Montana Stream Access Law
In the years leading up to the Court’s decision in Public Lands Access
Ass’n, tensions rose along the Ruby River as riparian landowners repeatedly
attempted to block public access to the river at bridge abutments.24 Fisher-
men, guides, and trappers have used county bridges and their abutments to
access the Ruby River since at least 1946.25 In July 2005, over 200 people
accessed the Ruby River at various bridges in an effort to publicize the
mounting tensions between riparian landowners along the river and recrea-
tional users.26 Access to Montana’s streams has been so controversial that
15. Violet v. Martin, 205 P. 221, 223 (Mont. 1922), overruled by Simonson v. McDonald, 311 P.2d
982, 986 (Mont. 1957); see also Johnson v. McMillan, 778 P.2d 395, 396 (Mont. 1989) (quoting
Kostbade v. Metier, 432 P.2d 383, 385 (Mont. 1967)), overruled by Warnack v. Coneen Fam. Tr., 879
P.2d 715, 722 (Mont. 1994).
16. Descheemaeker v. Anderson, 310 P.2d 587, 589 (Mont. 1957).
17. Maynard v. Bara, 30 P.2d 93, 95 (Mont. 1934).
18. Id.
19. State v. Portmann, 423 P.2d 56, 58 (Mont. 1967).
20. Laden v. Atkeson, 116 P.2d 881, 883 (Mont. 1941).
21. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
22. Id.
23. See Mattson v. Mont. Power Co., 215 P.3d 675, 689 (Mont. 2009).
24. Stauffer, supra note 4, at 1422.
25. Appellant’s Opening Brief, Pub. Lands Access Ass’n v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Madison
Cnty., 2012 WL 3757862 at *10–11 (Mont. 2014) (No. DA 12-0312).
26. Stauffer, supra note 4, at 1422.
4
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some have described it as a “class war” pitting the recreating public against
those fortunate enough to own land along a Montana river.27
The dispute over public access to Montana’s rivers played out through
litigation and legislation spanning the last 20 years.28 In 1985, Montana’s
Legislature passed the Montana Stream Access Law29 (MSAL), which rec-
ognized the public’s constitutional right to use “all surface waters capable
of recreational use . . . without regard to the ownership of the land underly-
ing the waters.”30 The Legislature passed the MSAL shortly after two Mon-
tana Supreme Court decisions declared Montanans have a constitutional
right to Montana’s surface waters. In Montana Coalition for Stream Access
v. Curran,31 the Court held the public had a right to use surface waters for
recreation and declared ownership of the riverbed and surface waters was a
“public trust” conferred upon the State “upon statehood.”32 Similarly, in
Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Hildreth,33 the Court stated Article
IX, Section 3(3), of the Montana Constitution “clearly provides that the
State owns the waters for the benefit of its people” and “does not limit the
waters’ use.”34 However, both cases make clear that the public’s right to
recreate on surface waters should not be “construed as granting the public
the right to enter upon or cross over private property” to access the wa-
ters.35 Although these cases and the MSAL grant the public the right to use
surface waters for recreation, it is not clear how the public might access
those waters.
While the recreating public is free to walk along the river up to the
high water mark,36 getting there can be difficult without a nearby access
point. In Galt v. Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks ex rel. State,37 the
Montana Supreme Court declared there was “no attendant right” to the pub-
lic’s use of surface waters for recreation to be as “convenient, productive,
and comfortable as possible.”38 The Court further stated that while both the
real property interests of private landowners and the public’s property inter-
est in water are important and constitutionally protected, when in competi-
tion they “must be reconciled to the extent possible.”39 Providing reasona-
27. Id. at 1427 (internal citation omitted).
28. See Mont. Coal. for Stream Access v. Curran, 82 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1984).
29. MONT. CODE ANN. § 23–2–302 (2013).
30. Id. § 23–2–302(1).
31. 682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1984).
32. Id. at 170.
33. 684 P.2d 1088 (Mont. 1984) overruled by Gray v. City of Billings, 689 P.2d 268 (Mont. 1984).
34. Id. at 1091.
35. Id.; Curran, 682 P.2d at 172.
36. Curran, 682 P.2d at 172.
37. 731 P.2d 912 (Mont. 1987).
38. Id. at 915.
39. Id. at 916.
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ble access is a balancing act that requires the state to “account for the ‘ex-
isting uses’ of private landowners.”40
The Legislature’s adoption of House Bill 190 in 2009, codified in the
Montana Code Annotated at § 23–2–312, was a legislative effort to balance
private landowners’ rights with the public’s right to access surface waters.41
On one hand, the statute provides any person can “gain access to surface
waters for recreational use by using: (a) a public bridge, its right-of-way,
and its abutments; and (b) a county road right-of-way.”42 On the other, the
statute “neither create[s] nor extinguish[es] any right related to county roads
established by prescriptive use.”43 By providing reasonable access points
where feasible and refusing to alter prescriptively gained roads across pri-
vate property, the statute protects private landowners from further public
encroachment onto their property. The Montana Attorney General Opinion
upon which the statute was based44 explains that a prescriptive road or
bridge’s amenability to stream access “is dependent upon their width and
use during the prescriptive period.”45 Therefore, the subsection regarding
prescriptive easements protects servient landowners in Montana from hav-
ing an increased burden placed upon their property by the public. The stat-
ute’s explicit grant of access to Montana streams at county road and bridge
right-of-ways was an even-handed allowance providing reasonable access
to the public while also protecting private landowners’ interests. However,
the Court’s decision creates a right related to a road established by prescrip-
tion despite the language of the statute.
While the Court and the Legislature recognized the public’s constitu-
tional right to use Montana’s surface waters, the MSAL has been criticized
for not providing the access necessary to enjoy this constitutional right.46
Consequently, some suggest the Montana Constitution creates an “affirma-
tive duty” for the state to provide the public with reasonable access to Mon-
tana’s streams.47 It is unclear whether this affirmative duty means landown-
ers must make accommodations for reasonable access. Nonetheless, critics
have argued the Montana Constitution demands that the State require land-
owners to provide reasonable accommodation to the recreating public.48
Because both private property interests and public stream interests are con-
40. Stauffer, supra note 4, at 1439 (citing Michael C. Blumm & Thea Schwartz, Mono Lake and the
Evolving Public Trust in Western Water, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 701, 712 (1995)); see also Galt, 731 P.2d at
916.
41. Pub. Lands Access Ass’n, 321 P.3d at 68 (McKinnon, J., dissenting).
42. MONT. CODE ANN. § 23–2–312(1).
43. Id. § 23–2–312(3).
44. H.R. 190, 61st Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2009).
45. Mont. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 13, 2000 WL 689341 at *7 (May 26, 2000).
46. Stauffer, supra note 4, at 1421.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1443.
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stitutionally protected, however, providing increased access through private
property is easier said than done.
Traditionally, landowners did not have to be concerned for their prop-
erty interests when fishermen or other recreationists crossed their private
property.49 However, the holding in Public Lands Access Ass’n has ex-
panded public access to Montana’s rivers by treading upon private land-
owners’ property interests. By holding that a use other than the historical
use through which the easement was gained may be considered a factor in
determining the width of a prescriptive easement and expanding the pub-
lic’s right of access into a prescriptive easement’s incidental maintenance
area, the Court has interfered with the delicate balance between private
property interests and the public’s right to access streams. Further, the
Court has created an access right where none should exist.
III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In May 2004, the Public Lands Access Association, Inc., (PLAA) sued
Madison County, seeking a declaratory judgment that the public could use
Seyler Lane, Duncan District Road, Lewis Lane, and their respective
bridges and abutments to access the Ruby River.50 Along Seyler Lane at
Seyler Bridge, James Kennedy, a riparian landowner, obtained a permit
from Madison County to build fences in the right-of-way of Seyler Lane up
to the abutments of Seyler Bridge.51 Kennedy erected electric fences pursu-
ant to his permit that kept his livestock on his property and off of Seyler
Lane.52 Kennedy’s fences also blocked public access to Ruby River at
Seyler Bridge.53 Although Kennedy removed the electric fences that
prompted PLAA’s lawsuit,54 he intervened in PLAA’s litigation to defend
his property rights.55 Kennedy contended the existing right-of-ways allowed
use by the public only upon the travelled surface between the fences and the
bridge. According to Kennedy, when the public stepped off the road to
scramble down to the river, they were overstepping the bounds of their
easement.56
49. See, e.g., Oates v. Knutson, 595 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Mont. 1979) (holding that fishing and other
recreational use was “insufficient to raise the presumption of adverse use.”).
50. Pub. Lands Access Ass’n, 321 P.3d at 40.
51. Id. at 41.
52. Id. at 45; Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 5, at *10.
53. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 25, at *1.
54. Id. at *3, 10.
55. Pub. Lands Access Ass’n, 321 P.3d at 40.
56. Brief of Appellee, Pub. Lands Access Ass’n v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Madison Cnty., 2012
WL 5248695 at *7–8 (Mont. Oct. 12, 2012) (No. DA 12-0312).
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The parties each moved for summary judgment in the Fifth Judicial
District Court for Madison County.57 In regards to Duncan district Road
and Lewis Lane, the district court held that the public could use the entire
right-of-way because both were committed to the public and defined by
either statutory petition or grant.58 The district court denied summary judg-
ment in regard to Seyler Lane because Seyler Lane’s right-of-way was es-
tablished by prescriptive use.59 Additional fact-finding was necessary to de-
termine the actual width of the Seyler Lane right-of-way and whether the
public was free to use the right-of-way to access the river.60 The parties
stipulated to the following facts: first, Kennedy owns the land underlying
Seyler Bridge and its approaches along with the bed and banks of the Ruby
River; second, Seyler Lane and Seyler Bridge are within a county road
right-of-way that was gained by prescription; third, Madison County as-
sumed jurisdiction over Seyler Lane and Seyler Bridge and is responsible
for maintaining both the travelled surface and “the areas beyond the trav-
elled surface and adjacent subsurface, by mowing, snow plowing, and weed
spraying.”61
On April 16, 2012, the district court held the public prescriptive ease-
ment provided a right for the public to travel only upon the travelled way
between the fences along Seyler Lane and Seyler Bridge. Madison County
had an extended right in a secondary easement, separate from the public
use, to “lateral and subjacent support” as was necessary for “maintenance
and repair.”62 The district court determined PLAA had failed to prove the
public prescriptive easement extended beyond Kennedy’s fences; thus, the
district court could not permit public access past the narrowed fences at the
abutments and down to the river.63 The district court further held recrea-
tional use was insufficient to establish a prescriptive easement. Accord-
ingly, the court did not allow PLAA to present evidence of recreational use
to establish a prescriptive right beyond the existing roadway.64 Finally, the
district court specified that use of a prescriptive easement is limited to the
use during the prescriptive period giving rise to the easement.65
PLAA appealed the district court’s decision, taking issue with the dis-
trict court’s conclusions that (1) the public easement was limited to the area
57. Pub. Lands Access Ass’n, 321 P.3d at 40.
58. Id. at 40–41.
59. Id. at 41.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 41–42.
63. Pub. Lands Access Ass’n, 321 P.3d at 41.
64. Id. at 45.
65. Id. at 47.
8
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within the fences,66 (2) evidence of recreational activity could not be con-
sidered in determining the extent of the easement,67 and (3) usage of a pre-
scriptive easement is limited to the usage giving rise to the easement.68
On appeal, PLAA asserted that, because Seyler Lane and Seyler
Bridge are within a county road right-of-way acquired by prescriptive use,
the public obtained by prescription the right to use the full right-of-way,
including the area necessary for maintenance of the roadway.69 PLAA ar-
gued that the district court’s delineation of the County’s secondary ease-
ment “improperly limited the public’s use” of its acquired rights.70 Further,
PLAA argued the district court erred in excluding historical evidence of
recreational use at Seyler Bridge.71
In response, Kennedy argued the district court’s decision that the pub-
lic did not have a right to use the maintenance area “legally established the
public’s right” to travel only on the surface of Seyler Lane and Seyler
Bridge and was not error.72 Additionally, Kennedy asserted that the district
court’s determination that Madison County had a secondary easement past
the bounds of the public’s easement should not be reversed because the
County had an undisputed duty to maintain and repair the public easement
that necessitated the use of additional land beyond the public’s travelled
way.73
IV. THE MONTANA SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN
PUBLIC LANDS ACCESS ASS’N
A. The Majority’s Decision and Reasoning
The Court reversed the district court’s delineation of a primary and
secondary easement at Seyler Lane and Seyler Bridge by finding that a
county right-of-way acquired by prescriptive use conferred public access to
the entirety of the easement.74 The Court held the district court incorrectly
relied upon cases defining secondary easements in regard to private ease-
ments to support its finding of a secondary easement. The Court noted a
secondary easement is incident to a private party’s prescriptive easement
for the maintenance and use of the easement.75 Consequently, the secondary
66. Id. at 42.
67. Id. at 45.
68. Id. at 46–47.
69. Pub. Lands Access Ass’n, 321 P.3d at 42.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 45.
72. Brief of Appellee, supra note 6, at *7–8.
73. Id. at *8–10.
74. Pub. Lands Access Ass’n, 321 P.3d at 42.
75. Id. at 43.
9
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easement is limited to the area necessary for maintenance of the prescriptive
easement.76 Although the Court noted established easement law limiting the
use of secondary easements, the Court distinguished this law as pertaining
to private rather than public easements.77 However, because Seyler Lane
and Seyler Bridge are a county road, the whole easement should be subject
to Montana Code Annotated § 7–14–2107(3), which does not distinguish
between the public’s use of the area of the road itself and the land “neces-
sary to enjoying and maintaining [the road].”78 To support its holding that a
county road gained by prescription included the maintenance area, the
Court cited several cases that took into account the maintenance of the road
in determining that adverse use existed.79 Further, the Court cited numerous
out-of-state decisions that held the width of a prescriptive public road in-
cludes the area necessary for maintaining the road.80 Because there was no
question as to whether Seyler Lane was a county road, the Court determined
there should be no differentiation between the prescriptive easement for the
travelled way and the maintenance area.81 Accordingly, the width of the
single, public road easement needed to be determined on remand.82
To provide guidance on a determination of the width of the easement,
the Court acknowledged that roadways gained by prescriptive use are not
subject to the statutory minimum width of 60 feet.83 The Court noted the
width of a prescriptive roadway is “determined as a question of fact by the
character and extent of its use.”84 Evidence of the County’s maintenance
would show the extent of the use.85 Since Seyler Bridge is connected to
Seyler Lane, the Court advised that land necessary to maintain the bridge
and its abutments should also be considered in determining the road’s right-
of-way at the bridge.86 Further, the Court held the district court erred by
excluding evidence of recreational use in determining the width of the pub-
lic right-of-way.87 The Court clarified that, although it has held that use by
fishermen and other recreationists is “not sufficient to establish prescriptive
use,”88 it has not held that “recreational use may never be considered.”89
76. Id. at 42–43.
77. Id. at 43.
78. MONT. CODE ANN. § 7–14–2107(3) (2013); Pub. Lands Access Ass’n, 321 P.3d at 43.
79. Pub. Lands Access Ass’n, 321 P.3d at 43.
80. Id. at 43–44.
81. Id. at 44.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. (quoting State v. Portmann, 423 P.2d 56, 58 (Mont. 1967)).
85. Pub. Lands Access Ass’n, 321 P.3d at 45.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 46.
88. Id. (quoting Leisz v. Avista Corp., 174 P.3d 481, 489 (Mont. 2007)).
89. Id.
10
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The difference is that a fisherman’s use of an abutment cannot create an
easement, in accordance with Montana Code Annotated § 23—2—
322(2)(b), but may be “one factor” used to determine the width of an ex-
isting prescriptive easement.90
Having determined the travelled way and the maintenance area were
all part of a single public right-of-way with a width to be determined by
evidence of maintenance and recreational use, the Court needed to deter-
mine whether the public could use the prescriptive roadway to access the
Ruby River. The issue was one of first impression in Montana and boiled
down to whether the use of a public prescriptive easement could be ex-
panded beyond the historical use that gave rise to the easement in the first
place. The Court determined that the use of a public road right-of-way es-
tablished by prescription is not limited to the “adverse usage through which
the easement was acquired.”91 The Court held that, unlike a private pre-
scriptive easement, the scope of use for a public prescriptive easement in-
cludes both “reasonably incident” and “reasonably foreseeable” uses.92 The
Court noted that in past instances where a public prescriptive road easement
had been established, the Court had not limited the scope of use to the
historic use through which the easement was acquired.
In determining that the use of a public prescriptive easement was lim-
ited to the historic use during the prescriptive period, the district court erred
by relying on Montana v. Portmann.93 Portmann held the use of a prescrip-
tive easement could never exceed the greatest use during the prescriptive
period. However, the Court in Portmann was concerned with defining the
width of a public prescriptive easement, not the scope of its use.94 Accord-
ingly, Portmann further justified the Court’s conclusion that “public uses
should be considered in determining the width of the public road right-of-
way.”95 The Court also noted that other states had not limited the use of a
prescriptive easement to the historical use during the prescriptive period
based on the logic that limiting the use of public highways would defeat the
“very nature of a public road system.”96 The Court determined that public
roadways gained by prescription should not be treated differently than pub-
lic highways in general and should be amenable to “all uses to which [they]
might reasonably be put in view of . . . the increasing needs of the public.”97
90. Id.
91. Pub. Lands Access Ass’n, 321 P.3d at 49.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 47; 423 P.2d 56, 58 (Mont. 1967).
94. Pub. Lands Access Ass’n, 321 P.3d at 47.
95. Id. (emphasis in original).
96. Id. at 48; Boykin v. Carbon Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 124 P.3d 677, 686 (Wyo. 2005).
97. Pub. Lands Access Ass’n, 321 P.3d at 48–49 (quoting Kipp v. Davis-Daly Copper Co., 110 P.
237, 240 (Mont. 1910)).
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Therefore, the Seyler Lane right-of-way should be amenable to foot traffic
down to the Ruby River because such use is a “reasonably foreseeable use”
of a roadway crossing a river.98 Thus, PLAA was not required to present
evidence of adverse travel along a fixed path down to the Ruby River in
order for the public to continue using Seyler Bridge to access the river.
B. Justice McKinnon’s Dissenting Opinion
Justice McKinnon pointed out that the majority opinion was based on
an incorrect stipulated fact. Justice McKinnon stated that the parties’ agree-
ment that Seyler Lane is a county road established by prescriptive easement
is incorrect for two reasons. First, county roads cannot be established by
prescriptive use. The methods for establishing a county road are codified in
Montana Code Annotated § 7–14–2101(2) to (3) and do not include pre-
scriptive use.99 Second, for Seyler Lane to be established as a county road,
Madison County needed to express through its board of commissioners its
intent to establish Seyler Lane as a county road.100 At trial, however,
Madison County asserted “its right to maintain Seyler Lane and Seyler
Bridge” was “separate from the general public’s prescriptive easement to
travel on the roadway.”101 Justice McKinnon discerned that if Madison
County had adopted Seyler Lane as a county road these “separate prescrip-
tive easements for maintenance would have been unnecessary.”102 Further,
referring to Seyler Lane as a county road right-of-way while also acknowl-
edging it was established by prescriptive use was “legally inconsistent.”103
As a result of the incorrect stipulation that Seyler Lane was a county
road, the Court incorrectly applied county road statutes to determine what
could be considered to define the width of the Seyler Lane right-of-way.
Justice McKinnon noted that a determination of the prescriptive easement
using county road or public highway statutes would be inconsistent with
Portmann.104 In Portmann, the Court held the public could “obtain title by
adverse possession of that only which it has occupied during the full statu-
tory period.”105 McKinnon asserted that when the Court claimed county
road statutes applied to Seyler Lane the Court not only misapplied the law
to a public highway gained by prescription but also twisted the language of
the statute to expand the width of a prescriptive public right-of-way.106
98. Id. at 49.
99. Id. at 57 (McKinnon, J., dissenting); MONT. CODE ANN. § 7–14–2101(2)–(3).
100. Pub. Lands Access Ass’n, 321 P.3d at 57–58 (McKinnon, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 58.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 60.
105. Portmann, 423 P.2d at 58.
106. Pub. Lands Access Ass’n, 321 P.3d at 60 (McKinnon, J., dissenting).
12
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Claiming that Montana Code Annotated § 7–14–2107(3) is inapplicable to
Seyler Lane, Justice McKinnon noted that the statute was intended to limit
the public’s acquisition to ‘“only’ the right-of-way and the incidents neces-
sary to enjoying and maintaining it.”107
Justice McKinnon specified that common law principles governing the
acquisition of prescriptive easements should define the width of the right-
of-way at Seyler Lane and Seyler Bridge. Since Justice McKinnon held that
county road statutes are inapplicable, remand for a determination of the
width of the right-of-way was unnecessary because the prescriptive public
road had already been defined by the physically paved way itself, and the
public’s right to travel is constrained to that definition.108 The cases cited
by the majority in support of the notion that the public’s prescriptive ease-
ment necessarily contains the maintenance area “do not hold that the main-
tenance and support area may also be used for public travel.”109 Justice
McKinnon argued that common law principles do not support the notion
that a public prescriptive road may be expanded beyond the area occupied
during the prescriptive period because this could effectively turn the main-
tenance area into the new travelled way.110 This new travelled way would
then require an expansion of the maintenance area and a further imposition
on private property.111 Further, Justice McKinnon claimed the majority’s
opinion disregarded common law precedent regarding public prescriptive
easements that clearly confined the prescriptive right to only the path trav-
elled during the prescriptive period.112 Justice McKinnon concluded by
claiming the Court’s decision embroiled it in the stream access controversy
by facilitating stream access where both precedent and the Legislature had
concluded none should exist.113
V. ANALYSIS
The Court has created a public stream access point where none should
exist. Although the Court has not increased the breadth of the right-of-way
necessary for maintaining Seyler Lane, the Court has expanded the area to
be publicly travelled by drawing an untenable distinction between private
and public prescriptive easements. In particular, two aspects of the Court’s
holding fail to withstand close scrutiny. First, the Court inappropriately de-
107. Id. (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 7–14–2107(3) (emphasis added)).
108. Id. at 64–65.
109. Id. at 62.
110. Id. at 65.
111. Id.
112. Pub. Lands Access Ass’n, 321 P.3d at 64–65 (McKinnon, J., dissenting); e.g. Portmann, 423
P.2d at 58; Maynard, 30 P.2d at 95.
113. Pub. Lands Access Ass’n, 321 P.3d at 68 (McKinnon, J., dissenting).
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termined that a single expansive easement exists that is entirely open to
public travel. Second, the Court unfittingly declared that a non-historical
recreational use could be considered in determining the width of the ex-
panded easement.
A. The Maintenance Area is Incident to and Distinguished
From the Travelled Way
The majority held the public acquired a single public right-of-way at
Seyler Lane and Seyler Bridge.114 To reach this conclusion, the majority
asserted county road and public highway statutes support the expansion of
the public’s right to use Seyler Lane and Seyler Bridge.115 However, the
public’s right to access Seyler Lane and Seyler Bridge is limited by the fact
that Seyler Lane and Seyler Bridge are within a public prescriptive ease-
ment. Therefore, the public’s acquired right should be established and lim-
ited by the common law authorities that govern private and public prescrip-
tive easements.
The majority incorporates the parties’ stipulation that Seyler Lane and
Seyler Bridge are a county road and applies county road statutes to support
the assertion that the public acquired one expansive easement through pre-
scription.116 If Seyler Lane were a statutorily established county road, there
would not be a distinction between the easement gained by travel and the
easement gained by maintenance.117 Instead, as provided in Montana Code
Annotated § 7–14–2107, the public would gain access to the entire road-
way, including the incidental maintenance area.118 While § 7–14–2107
governs county roads “lawfully acquire[d]” by the board of county commis-
sioners, it does not govern prescriptively acquired public easements.119 Sec-
tion 7–14–2101(4)(b) lists the ways by which a county road may be ac-
quired. As Justice McKinnon observed, the enumerated list of methods by
which a county road may be acquired does not include prescriptive use.120
Because prescriptive use is not a means of establishing a county road and it
is not disputed that the public acquired its right to Seyler Lane through
prescriptive use, Seyler Lane is not governed by county road statutes.
114. Id. at 42 (majority opinion).
115. Id. at 43.
116. Id. at 42–44.
117. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 7–14–2107.
118. Id. § 7–14–2107(3).
119. See id. § 7–14–2107(1).
120. See id. § 7–14–2101(4)(b); Pub. Lands Access Ass’n, 321 P.3d at 57 (McKinnon, J., dissent-
ing).
14
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Further, in Pedersen v. Dawson County,121 the Court recognized that
“implicit in all of Title 7, Chapter 14 as well as our prior decisions is that
county roads cannot be created without the county’s intent, expressed
through its board of commissioners, to do so.” 122 Rather than designating
Seyler Lane as a county road, however, Madison County asserted that its
right to maintain, repair and replace the paved portions of Seyler Lane and
Seyler Bridge arose through the County’s own prescriptively established
easement.123 As Justice McKinnon observed, Madison County’s assertion is
inconsistent with the laws governing the creation of county roads and would
have been unnecessary if Seyler Lane were indeed a county road.124 In
short, the parties’ stipulation that Seyler Lane and Seyler Bridge are a
county road is contrary to the laws regarding the establishment of county
roads. The Court is bound to the parties’ stipulations “unless contrary to
law, court rule, or public policy.”125 Accordingly, the Court was not bound
to the parties’ stipulation and should have refrained from applying county
road law. For these reasons, § 7–14–2107(3) cannot support the assertion
that the public has acquired one expansive and unconstrained right-of-way
that includes unlimited access to the maintenance area.
The majority opinion uses public highway statutes to support the ex-
panded public right at Seyler Lane and Seyler Bridge.126 Despite the
Court’s assertion, these statutes support the use of common law as the
means for determining the public’s right. Section 60–1–103(22) provides
that the public may acquire a public highway, including a bridge, by the
public’s adverse use when jurisdiction has been assumed by “any political
subdivision of the state.”127 A “public highway” is also a general term de-
fined as a public way “for purposes of vehicular travel” and includes “the
entire area within the right-of-way.”128 The term “highway” includes
“rights-of-way or other interests in land” while “right-of-way” is defined as
“a general term denoting land, property, or any interest in land or property
. . . acquired for or devoted to highway purposes.”129 Accordingly, the in-
terest the public gained is the land devoted to highway purposes. However,
this general definition of what the public has acquired should yield to the
121. 17 P.3d 393 (Mont. 2000).
122. Id. at 396.
123. Pub. Lands Access Ass’n, 321 P.3d at 58 (McKinnon, J., dissenting).
124. Id.
125. Sch. Dist. No. 4, Lincoln Cnty. V. Colburg, 547 P.2d 84, 86–87 (Mont. 1976).
126. Pub. Lands Access Ass’n, 321 P.2d at 45.
127. MONT. CODE ANN. § 60–1–103(22)(d) (2013).
128. Id. § 60–1–103(19).
129. Id. §§ 60–1–103(18), (23) (emphasis added).
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specific definition of what has been acquired, especially when the two are
inconsistent.130
Specifically, when the public takes land for a highway, the public
“may acquire a fee simple or any lesser estate or interest.”131 The Court
recently reiterated the understanding that “an easement is an interest held
by one person in lands owned by another, consisting of the right to use the
land for a specific purpose.”132 Because the public’s acquisition of both
Seyler Lane and Seyler Bridge was through a prescriptive easement, the
interest the public acquired is the lesser interest defined by the easement.
Statutorily, the establishment of an easement is “determined by the terms of
the grant or the enjoyment by which [the easement] was acquired.”133 In
other words, because it is undisputed that the public gained access to Seyler
Lane and Seyler Bridge through a prescriptive easement, the interest the
public gained should be determined and limited by the laws governing pub-
lic prescriptive easements, not highway laws.
As previously discussed, the laws governing the establishment of pre-
scriptive easements are well established in Montana.134 In order to establish
a prescriptive easement, “the party claiming the easement must show ‘open,
notorious, exclusive, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted use of the ease-
ment’” for the full five-year statutory period.135 A public easement does not
require exclusivity of use.136 However, when a public prescriptive easement
is established, there must be convincing evidence that the public has “pur-
sued a definite, fixed course, continuously and uninterruptedly.”137 The par-
ties did not dispute the fact that the public acquired the right to use Seyler
Lane and Seyler Bridge through prescription; therefore, these elements
must have all been met at the time the easement was established.138 It is
also undisputed that when a prescriptive easement is gained there is an inci-
dental area also acquired for maintenance.139 The issue, then, is whether
this area is a limited secondary easement when the prescriptive easement is
public.140
130. See id. § 1–2–102 (2013); Mont. Stockgrowers Ass’n v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 777 P.2d
285, 290 (Mont. 1989) (“In construing statutory definitions according to the intent of the legislature, it is
fundamental that the specific prevails over the general.”).
131. MONT. CODE ANN. § 60–4–101 (emphasis added).
132. Woods v. Shannon, 344 P.3d 413, 368 (Mont. 2015) (emphasis added).
133. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70–17–106.
134. Rasmussen v. Fowler, 800 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Mont. 1990).
135. Pub. Lands Access Ass’n v. Boone and Crockett Club Found., 856 P.2d 525, 527 (quoting
Keebler v. Harding, 807 P.2d 1354, 1356 (Mont. 1991)).
136. Hitshew v. Butte/Silver Bow Cnty., 974 P.2d 650, 654 (Mont. 1999).
137. Violet, 205 P. at 223.
138. See Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 25, at *19.
139. Pub. Lands Access Ass’n, 321 P.3d at 42–43.
140. Id. at 43.
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The Court deviates from precedent by finding that when a public pre-
scriptive easement is at issue, there should be no distinction between the
different areas of public control.141 The majority cites several Montana
cases as authority for the position that there is one undivided public road
right-of-way.142 However, these cases merely stand for the holding that
maintenance of the road by the county is sufficient to show adverse control
by the public, not that there is one undivided road right-of-way. In Rasmus-
sen v. Fowler,143 the Court accepted adverse use by the public as well as
maintenance by the county as “sufficient to show adverse control” to estab-
lish an easement by prescription. 144 In McClurg v. Flathead County Com-
missioners,145 the Court again considered the county’s maintenance of a
publicly used road to be evidence supporting the establishment of a public
prescriptive easement.146 The Court reached similar holdings in Public
Lands Access Ass’n v. Jones,147 Hitshew v. Butte/Silver Bow County,148 and
Swandal Ranch Co. v. Hunt.149 However, in all of these cases, the issue was
not the width of the easement, nor whether the public could use the secon-
dary easement for travel, but whether there was a prescriptive easement at
all.150 The Court cited Smith v. Russell151 as further support, but the issue in
that case was whether a public right-of-way given to the city had been aban-
doned by the city, and the case does not discuss adverse use at any point,
making it irrelevant to the current discussion. The cases relied upon by the
Court did not take into account evidence of maintenance to determine what
area was conferred, but rather, to determine whether a prescriptive easement
existed at all. Consequently, these cases do not support the assertion that
when a public road is established by a public prescriptive easement, there is
no distinction between the areas acquired by the public. In holding other-
wise, the Court provided increased access across private property by assert-
ing that both the primary and secondary easements were acquired by the
public when the easement was established.
141. Id. at 43–44.
142. Id. at 43.
143. 800 P.2d 1053 (Mont. 1990).
144. Id. at 1056.
145. 610 P.2d 1153 (Mont. 1980).
146. Id. at 1156.
147. 104 P.3d 496, 502 (Mont. 2004) (holding that adverse use by the public coupled with county’s
maintenance of the road to be sufficient to establish a public prescriptive easement).
148. Hitshew, 974 P.2d at 654–655 (finding that the county’s maintenance of the disputed road, as
well as other adverse uses by the public, established a public prescriptive easement).
149. Swandal Ranch Co., 915 P.2d at 844–845 (finding that the county’s maintenance of the dis-
puted road without permission, as well as public uses of the road, supported a finding of adverse usage).
150. Rasmussen, 800 P.2d at 1055; McClurg, 610 P.2d at 1156; Hitshew, 974 P.2d at 653; Swandal
Ranch Co., 915 P.2d at 842–843; Jones, 104 P.3d at 498.
151. 80 P.3d 431 (Mont. 2003).
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The rules governing the establishment of public prescriptive easements
do not contemplate establishing an overly broad area for general use by the
public; instead, the rules serve to constrain what the public acquires. When
the public is establishing a prescriptive easement, the definite and fixed
path it pursues cannot deviate.152 When the public acquires an easement by
using one part of a road, the public may not then claim a right to a portion
beyond what was occupied.153 Further, the public cannot gain title through
adverse use of any land that was not used during the statutory period,154 and
the public’s use may not become a greater imposition upon the landowner
than the greatest imposition recognized during the prescriptive period.155
Leaving the road to travel down to the river certainly qualifies as a devia-
tion that could not have led to a prescriptive right. If this beaten path down
to the river were part of the original public use that established the ease-
ment, then there would be no contest about whether the public could con-
tinue to use the path because it would not be a use in excess of the greatest
use made during the prescriptive period. However, without evidence that
the path down to the river was part of the original prescriptive use, there can
be no dispute that the path is a use in excess of the use that established the
easement. Accordingly, the public’s claim that the path is part of the ease-
ment should be barred because it is a claim to another portion of the ease-
ment not occupied by the public.156
When the public acquired the right to use Seyler Lane and Seyler
Bridge, the public necessarily gained lands adjacent to the travelled way for
the support and maintenance of the newly acquired public right. The Court
in Mattson v. Montana Power Co.157 cited with approval the assertion in
Crutchfield v. F.A. Sebring Realty Co.158 that “every easement carries with
it by implication the right, sometimes called a secondary easement, of doing
what is reasonably necessary for the full enjoyment of the easement it-
self.”159 Notably, there is no distinction between private and public ease-
ments. Common sense dictates that this incidental right is necessary
whether the prescriptive easement is being acquired by a private individual
or by the public and should not be expanded simply because the easement is
public. In Laden v. Atkeson,160 the Court stated that a secondary easement is
to be used “only when necessary and in such a reasonable manner as not to
152. Descheemaeker, 310 P.2d at 589.
153. Maynard, 30 P.2d at 95.
154. Id.
155. Portmann, 423 P.2d at 58.
156. Maynard, 30 P.2d at 95.
157. 215 P.3d 675 (Mont. 2009).
158. 69 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1954).
159. Mattson, 215 P.3d at 687 (quoting Crutchfield, 69 So. 2d at 330 (emphasis added)).
160. 116 P.2d 881 (Mont. 1941).
18
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needlessly increase the burden upon the servient tenement.”161 To limit the
private use of an incidental easement area but allow unfettered use of the
same area when the easement is public does not make sense given the bur-
den allowing an unlimited number of people to traverse the maintenance
area would place upon the servient tenement. The maintenance area is in-
tended for maintenance and repair of the travelled way and should not be-
come the object of maintenance and repair itself. Allowing unfettered pub-
lic access into the maintenance easement would increase the effects of ero-
sion, consequently causing a greater need for maintenance and repair within
the maintenance area itself. Such increased use would be outside the scope
of the incidental maintenance easement and would inevitably burden the
servient tenement in an unnecessary manner.
The majority notes the established law recognized in Laden, that an
incidental easement is to be sparingly used so as not to unduly burden the
servient tenement, but draws a distinction based upon the fact that the ease-
ment in Laden was a private one.162 The majority then states that there has
not been a distinction in Montana law between the areas gained in a public
prescriptive easement and cites numerous Montana cases.163 However, as
previously discussed, the cited authorities do not support this position be-
cause they never had cause to address the issue.164 Although there is not a
distinction between private and public prescriptive easements, the long-
standing principles applicable to prescriptive easements establish that sec-
ondary easements are only given for necessary maintenance purposes. It
does not make sense to expand access simply because the easement is pub-
lic and not private. Accordingly, the majority’s distinction between public
and private appears artificial because it is inconsistent with longstanding
easement principle.
The Court then asserts that this lack of distinction between the primary
and secondary easement is consistent with the general rule recognized in
other jurisdictions and cites to multiple out-of-state cases.165 Nevertheless,
these cases do not establish that the incidental area is undistinguished and
may be used at the whim of the traveling public. Rather, the court in Nikiel
v. City of Buffalo166 stated that the incidental area is included as necessary
for “highway purposes.”167 Uninhibited travel by the public over the shoul-
ders of the road certainly should not qualify as highway purposes. In Keidel
161. Id. at 883 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
162. Pub. Lands Access Ass’n, 321 P.3d at 42–43.
163. Id. at 43.
164. Rasmussen, 800 P.2d at 1055; McClurg, 610 P.2d at 1156; Hitshew, 974 P.2d at 653; Swandall
Ranch Co., 915 P.2d at 843; Jones, 104 P.3d at 501.
165. Pub. Lands Access Ass’n, 321 P.3d at 43–44.
166. 165 N.Y.S.2d 592 (N.Y. App. Div. 1957).
167. Id. at 597 (emphasis added).
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v. Rask,168 the court first noted that, as a general rule, the use of a prescrip-
tive easement is fixed and “no use can be justified . . . unless it can fairly be
regarded as within the range of privileges asserted by the adverse user and
acquiesced in by the owner of the servient tenement.”169 The court then
stated that the width is determined by the actual use for roadway purposes
but also “necessarily includes” adjacent land “which is needed for the pre-
scription to be maintained as a public road.”170 Beating a trail down to the
river is not a necessary use of the incidental area for maintenance, and the
current controversy demonstrates that it is not a use “acquiesced in by the
owner of the servient tenement.”171 In Campbell v. Covington County,172
the Mississipi Supreme Court stated that the public is “not limited” to the
actual width of the “beaten path” because the “prescriptive right carries
with it the beaten path and whatever is necessary to make the beaten path a
usable highway.”173 However, the court then clarified that just because the
public was not limited to solely the beaten path “does not mean that the
prescriptive right carries with it the right in the public to lay out and con-
struct an extended and enlarged highway; they are confined to the prescrip-
tive right.” 174 This clearly establishes that the public is not at leisure to
traverse the maintenance area at will or to establish a new path. Instead,
these authorities bestow the incidental area to the public exclusively for
necessary uses, distinguishing the incidental easement from the prescriptive
easement by the limitation on its use. None of these cases support the no-
tion that the adjacent land gained for maintenance may become an ex-
panded area for public travel.
The out-of-state authorities cited by the Court make clear that the pub-
lic gains an incidental area as necessary for maintenance and, although it is
public and not consistently labeled a “secondary easement,” this does not
mean that the public may use the area at the public’s whim and for non-
maintenance purposes. Rather, this incidental area is distinguished by the
means through which it was acquired. The majority does not recognize this
incidental right as a separate secondary easement because this would limit
the public’s use of the area conferred under this right. By holding that the
public has gained one unrestricted easement, the Court is seizing an oppor-
tunity to increase access across a landowner’s property while avoiding an
express requirement that the landowner accommodate public access. Re-
gardless of what the incidental area is called, the public derived the right to
168. 290 N.W.2d 255 (N.D. 1980).
169. Id. at 258.
170. Id. (emphasis added).
171. Id.
172. 137 So. 111 (Miss. 1931) (emphasis added).
173. Id. at 112.
174. Id. (emphasis added).
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use it from a secondary easement and the public’s right should be confined
to the rights acquired in a secondary easement, notwithstanding the fact that
the secondary easement is public. For these reasons, the public has not
gained one expansive and unrestricted roadway but has gained a public pre-
scriptive easement with an incidental maintenance area that may be used
only as necessary for maintenance and in accordance with secondary ease-
ment laws.
By holding that the public has gained one expansive easement, the
Court is allowing the public to use the incidental area to access the Ruby
River under a purportedly already acquired right of use. However, the Court
is expanding the right the public gained in the maintenance area and creat-
ing access where none should exist. The maintenance area gained by the
public should be used strictly for necessary maintenance and should not be
open for public stream access.
B. Recreational Use Should Not Define the Right-of-Way of
Seyler Lane or Seyler Bridge
Since the Court decided the public had gained one unrestricted ease-
ment that would allow public travel down to the Ruby River, the Court next
needed to ensure that the width of the easement would be expansive enough
to accommodate this stream access. The majority remanded the case to the
district court to determine a “definite width of the public road right-of-way
at Seyler Bridge.”175 To aid the district court in its task of determining the
various widths, the majority instructed the district court to consider
§ 60–1–103(2) when determining the width at the bridge, § 7–14–2107(3)
when determining what was necessary for maintenance and enjoyment, and
§ 70–17–106 to allow historical use including recreational use to further
determine the width.176 As previously discussed, county road statutes are
not applicable and public highway statutes suggest the use of common law
to determine the interest gained by the public. Consequently,
§ 7–14–2107(3) and § 60–1–103(2) should not be used to dictate the width
of the easement. This leaves § 70–17–106 as the only appropriate authority
left to guide the district court’s determination of the width of the Seyler
Lane and Seyler Bridge right-of-way.
Section 70–17–106 provides that “the extent of a servitude is deter-
mined by the terms of the grant or the nature of the enjoyment by which it
was acquired.”177 The “enjoyment by which it was acquired” language
points to established prescriptive law in Montana dictating that the width of
175. Pub. Lands Access Ass’n, 321 P.3d at 46.
176. Id.
177. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70–17–106 (emphasis added).
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the public’s prescriptive easement should be limited to the width estab-
lished by use during the prescriptive period. As early as 1936, Montana
recognized that the public could obtain the right to use private property
through adverse possession but that the public right would be limited to
only the land occupied during the prescriptive period.178 Additionally, when
defining the public easement, it should be only as wide as is “reasonably
necessary and convenient for the purpose for which it was created,” its his-
toric use.179 Despite these established laws, the majority failed to recognize
that where § 70–17–106 provides that an easement is determined by “the
enjoyment by which it was acquired,” it limited the evidence that could be
used to define the easement to evidence of the historical use during the
prescriptive period.180 Accordingly, unless it can be proved that public rec-
reation was one of the historical uses through which the easement was
gained, evidence of recreational use should not inform the district court’s
determination of the width of the easement.
The majority cites to Brown & Brown of MT, Inc. v. Raty,181 Schmid v.
Pastor,182 and Public Lands Access Ass’n v. Jones to support the assertion
that recreational use may determine the width of the right-of-way at Seyler
Lane and Seyler Bridge.183 While these cases all consider recreational use
in relation to establishing a prescriptive easement, these cases all confine
their consideration to recreational uses that were a historical use through
which the easement was established. In Brown & Brown, the Court consid-
ered recreational use only when determining whether or not the contested
prescriptive easement could be used for recreational purposes.184 Finding
that recreational use was one of the uses through which the prescriptive
easement had been gained, the Court remanded the case to the district court
to limit the recreational use “to those historical uses established during the
prescriptive period.”185 In Schmid, the Court considered recreational uses
that “occurred in conjunction” with residential use to determine that a pre-
scriptive easement existed and limited the width of the easement to that
dictated by the historical use.186 Although the Court in Schmid considered
recreational use to determine the width and scope of the easement, the
Court limited itself to the historical recreational use that was a factor in
178. Peasley v. Trosper, 64 P.2d 109, 110 (Mont. 1936).
179. Leffingwell Ranch, Inc. v. Cieri, 916 P.2d 751, 757 (Mont. 1996).
180. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70–17–106.
181. 289 P.3d 156, 164 (Mont. 2012).
182. 216 P.3d 192, 196 (Mont. 2009).
183. Pub. Lands Access Ass’n, 321 P.3d at 46.
184. Brown & Brown, 289 P.3d at 164–165.
185. Id.
186. Schmid, 216 P.3d at 196.
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establishing the prescriptive easement in the first place.187 In Jones, the
Court found that there was “adequate evidence of the historical use” of the
contested road to establish a public prescriptive easement, but merely listed
recreational use as one of the historical uses through which the public had
gained the easement.188 These authorities make clear the conclusion that
while recreational use may be considered in determining the width of the
prescriptive easement, the considered recreational use must be one of the
historical uses through which the prescription was gained.
The issues in Public Lands Access Ass’n did not include whether or
not a public prescriptive easement exists.189 The parties agreed the public
had occupied the paved portions of Seyler Lane and Seyler Bridge “openly,
notoriously, exclusively, adversely, continuously and uninterrupted for the
requisite statutory period.”190 PLAA never asserted recreational use was
one of the historical uses through which the public had gained the ease-
ment.191 Instead, PLAA attempted to present evidence of recreational use
outside of the occupied portion of the road to expand the area the public had
gained by prescription.192 Since it is conceded that the historic use through
which the public gained the prescriptive easement was by travelling the
paved portions of Seyler Lane and Seyler Bridge, any use beyond the paved
portion of the road would be a use in excess of the use through which the
easement was gained. Any evidence of recreational use that is not asserted
to be the historic use through which the public gained the easement in the
first place is evidence of a use in excess of the historical use. Consequently,
such evidence cannot be used to inform the determination of the public
right-of-way.
Section 70–17–106 dictates that the extent of the servitude at Seyler
Lane and Seyler Bridge is determined by the nature of the enjoyment
through which the easement was gained. Since it is not disputed that the
prescriptive easement at Seyler Lane and Seyler Bridge was gained by the
public’s use of the paved portion of the roadway, there is no need for a
further determination of the public’s acquired right. The public has only
acquired the land “which it has occupied during the full statutory pe-
riod.”193 The public acquired the right to use Seyler Lane and Seyler Bridge
by using the paved portion of the road, and consequently, the public’s un-
restricted right of use extends only as wide as the pavement upon which it
was founded.
187. Id.
188. Jones, 104 P.3d at 502.
189. Pub. Lands Access Ass’n, 321 P.3d at 40.
190. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 25, at *19.
191. Id.
192. Id. at *36–37.
193. Peasley, 64 P.2d at 110.
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The public has also gained a distinguishable secondary easement as
necessary for maintenance and repair of the travelled way. Since the pur-
pose for which this secondary easement was created is maintenance and
repair, the width of this area is limited to the land reasonably necessary for
those purposes.194 However, as Justice McKinnon discerned, the width of
the incidental area is not one of the questions presented and did not need to
be determined.195 It is worth reiterating that while this incidental area has
been acquired by the public, this does not mean that the public may use this
area at will. As stated in Leffingwell Ranch, Inc. v. Cieri,196 “no use may be
made of the right-of-way different from the use established at the time of
the creation of the easement so as to burden the servient estate to a greater
extent than was contemplated at the time the easement was created.” 197
Accordingly, the public has a right to use this incidental easement exclu-
sively for maintenance and repair and the width of the easement is con-
strained to the land necessary for those purposes.
While concluding its discussion on the issue of width, the Court
granted PLAA another opportunity to further expand the public easement
over Kennedy’s property even beyond the land necessary for mainte-
nance.198 The Court stated that “any recreational uses by the public beyond
the width necessary for . . . maintenance and repair . . . would have to be
established through clear and convincing evidence for the requisite statutory
period.”199 Granting that recreational use alone can establish a prescriptive
easement is in direct contradiction to established Montana law. Section
23–2–322(2)(b) provides that “the entering or crossing of private property
to reach surface waters” cannot create a prescriptive easement.200 Nonethe-
less, the Court granted PLAA the opportunity to put on evidence of recrea-
tional use to access the Ruby River as long as it occurred before 1985, the
year § 23–2–322 was enacted.201 However, even before 1985, it was well
established that recreational use alone is insufficient to “raise the presump-
tion of adverse use”202 and “falls short of the type of usage necessary to
result in the accrual of a public right.”203 While recreational use may be one
factor in determining that a prescriptive easement exists, it cannot be the
sole use that establishes a prescriptive easement. Accordingly, any recrea-
194. See Leffingwell Ranch, Inc., 916 P.2d at 757.
195. Pub. Lands Access Ass’n, 321 P.3d at 65 (McKinnon, J., dissenting).
196. 916 P.2d 751 (Mont. 1996).
197. Id. at 757 (quoting Lindley v. Maggert, 645 P.2d 430, 432 (Mont. 1982)).
198. Pub. Lands Access Ass’n, 321 P.3d at 46.
199. Id.
200. MONT. CODE ANN. § 23–2–322(2)(b).
201. Pub. Lands Access Ass’n, 321 P.3d at 46.
202. Oates, 595 P.2d at 1184.
203. Ewan v. Stenberg, 541 P.2d 60, 63 (Mont. 1975).
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tional uses of Kennedy’s property should not, standing alone, be sufficient
to establish another prescriptive easement.
The Court needlessly confused the well-established laws of prescrip-
tion in Montana by directing the district court to establish a “definite width
of the public road right-of-way at Seyler Bridge” by considering evidence
of a non-historic use.204 The public gained the right to travel across Ken-
nedy’s property by using the paved portions of Seyler Lane and Seyler
Bridge. Accordingly, the district court need not look further for a definite
width of the right-of-way than the measurements of the paved road itself.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Montana Supreme Court disregarded established prescriptive
easement law in Montana by holding that a public prescriptive easement
grants unrestrained access to the incidental maintenance area and by al-
lowing evidence of a non-historical use to inform the determination of the
easement’s width. In concluding public prescriptive easements are not de-
lineated by primary and secondary easements, the Court disregarded estab-
lished precedent regarding prescriptive easements and drew an untenable
distinction between private and public prescriptive easements. By directing
the district court to consider evidence of recreational use even after the
parties had acknowledged that the prescriptive easement was acquired by
use of the paved area, the Court needlessly confused the laws concerning
the establishment of prescriptive easements. The Court was correct in dis-
cerning that once a public prescriptive easement has been established, the
use of that easement should be open to foreseeable uses that include recrea-
tional uses. However, the Court confused the laws regarding prescriptive
easements by allowing foreseeable uses to occur off the beaten path and
into the incidental maintenance area. Granting the public the right to use the
maintenance area for more than maintenance and repair unduly burdens the
servient landowner.
The Court has disturbed the delicate balance between the public’s right
to access surface waters and private landowner’s property rights. A pre-
scriptive easement, either public or private, needs to be confined to the path
that gave rise to the easement in the first place. Otherwise, the definition of
the easement may continue to grow and further infringe upon the private
property rights of the servient landowner. Further, unrestricted public use
should be confined to the paved portion of the roadway acquired during the
prescriptive period and should not be expanded into the maintenance area
by considering the subsequent use of the easement by recreationists to ac-
cess the Ruby River. The Court’s holding has inequitably expanded the
204. Pub. Lands Access Ass’n, 321 P.3d at 46.
25
Inabnit: Montana's Expansion of Prescriptive Easement Law in PLAA v. Madison County
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2016
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\77-1\MON103.txt unknown Seq: 26  9-FEB-16 12:55
210 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 77
public’s acquired right to traverse Kennedy’s property by misusing pre-
scriptive easement law to create public access where none should exist.
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